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Abstract—IT security community is recently facing a change
of trend from closed to open working groups and from restrictive
information to full information disclosure and sharing. One major
feature for this trend change is the number of incidents and
various Indicators of compromise (IoC) that appear on a daily
base, which can only be faced and solved in a collaborative way.
Sharing information is key to stay on top of the threats.
To cover the needs of having a medium for information
sharing, different initiatives were taken such as the Open Source
Threat Intelligence Platform called MISP [26]. At current state,
this sharing and collection platform has become far more than
a malware information sharing platform. It includes all kind
of IoCs, malware and vulnerabilities, but also financial threat or
fraud information. Hence, the volume of information is increasing
and evolving.
In this paper we present implemented distributed data inter-
action methods for MISP followed by a generic scoring model for
decaying information that is shared within MISP communities. As
the MISP community members do not have the same objectives,
use cases and implementations of the scoring model are discussed.
A commonly encountered use case in practice is the detection of
indicators of compromise in operational networks.
PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE REPORT
I. INTRODUCTION
On a daily basis new threats appear and disappear on the
scenes of cybercrime with no indication that this phenomenon
ceases shortly. Fighting threats as a singular has become
impossible nowadays and communities have formed to share
information about threats and work collaboratively to handle
the problems.
Collaboration and information sharing have become a key
element in the world of threat processing in incident response.
Surely, on one side, sharing information is a critical point due
to sensitive data it may include respectively the authenticity
of information itself, but on the other, joint-efforts to handle
a problem have direct impact on reaction time and resources.
The sudden appearance of different kind of information sharing
platforms over recent past confirmed this trend.
In this paper, a scoring model for the open source threat
intelligence platform called MISP [26] is presented. The aim
of MISP permits various actors, be it from private or public
IT-communities to share their information, IoCs, malware
and other existing threats. MISP is a peer to peer sharing
platform. It is not unusual that a piece of information transits
through multiple nodes from the producer to the consumer,
raising trust and data quality issues as it is not always known
how the shared information was acquired and trusted. MISP
provides various features to share additional information about
its context. Currently, 47 MISP taxonomies are available for
providing some context to a piece of information which are
regularly used in MISP communities.
A lot of research activities have been done in the domain of
introduction systems ranging from the automated derivation of
signatures to the exploration of anomaly detection techniques
to the application of machine learning. However, only little
effort was done to efficiently share signatures for intrusion
detection system or even care about their validity or freshness.
Since its early beginning, MISP was capable of sharing and
exporting IDS signatures, which are ingested by intrusion
detection systems. It also provides features where intrusion
detection systems or humans can offer feedback, whether they
have seen a given piece of information, or if it is a false positive
or whether it will expire soon. This feedback is then distributed
in the communities following the peer to peer data distribution
model of MISP.
This paper presents implemented data interaction models in
MISP, proposes the scoring model that uses these operational
parameters to help to consume attributes and take decision
about them. The paper is organized as follows, section II
discusses relevant approaches focussing on threat intelligence
collection, processing and sharing. Section III is a general
introduction to the MISP plateform. In section IV, the data
interaction methods are presented. In section V attribute scor-
ing methods are introduced to the reader. Since research is still
ongoing, some future work and conclusions are presented in
section VII.
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II. RELATED WORK
Recent studies in cybersecurity [10][11] showed that one
major key to successful cyber incident response is information
sharing in its different forms, either by trusted third parties,
email lists of CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Teams)
or threat intelligence and information sharing platforms.
There are many information sharing platforms available in
the IT world, whereas a lot of them are commercial enterprises
selling threat intelligence as a service in their portfolios.
Besides these commercial tools, a lot of effort has already
been made in the open domain too. Different initiatives such as
STIX/TAXII [25][23] have been developed to set up specifica-
tions for cyber threat information exchange and standardized
communication languages for information sharing.
The platform we used for implementing the scoring method
is MISP. In [26], the MISP platform is described from a
technical perspective and its main modules introduced. A
major advantage is that MISP is a collaborative open-source
project that continuously evolves by community-driven effort.
Each member can consume or produce threat intelligence data.
A case study on information sharing is presented in [11],
where a survey was performed on different aspects as hurdles,
problems and legal aspects in information sharing. The major
outcome was that information sharing remains a group or
community activity. Another interesting outcome of this survey
was the need for accurate information sharing practices and
low false positive rates.
Information sharing is related to a lot of challenges as
presented in [3], where requirements and needs for successful
threat intelligence platforms, such as the added value of shared
data and privacy, are discussed. Other requirements are for
example a new quality control approaches.
In [6], the facility to share information, automate infor-
mation sharing and the ability to generate, refine and control
data is discussed by redefining these problems into a concept
of knowledge management for the area of cyber security by
adding user needs. This leads to the fact of the veracity of
information and also to false positives. In [14], an assessment
approach for malware threat levels is introduced, based on
scores and weighting factors. Article [28] refers to a data
mining approach using similarity metrics to identify statistical
relations in shared information. In [1] is described a data-
driven approach to evaluate and visualize mixed content from
news and social media content based on emotive facets to give
value to content.
A common approach in intrusion detection for example,
to refer to threshold-based methods for triggering alarms. A
lot work has already been done in this direction and a lot
of surveys were published, which highlight the most common
works [16][12]. Threshold-based event detection has shown to
be a reliable approach in statistical, game-theoretical and data
mining evaluation techniques [2][18] [9] [13].
Beside the information that can already be analyzed for
further purpose, is the data itself, as for example the used
IP-addresses, protocols, timestamps, etc. The analysis and
interpretation of these vectors also represents a significant part
of the sightings approach. One major source of information
can be netflow [19] information for example, which can be
combined to hash functions and bloom filters, aggregation
methods and other reduction techniques for evaluation purpose
[13][8][17][27][22] [24].
III. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON MISP
In the following paragraphs, we will shortly introduce
the MISP tool and highlight its main functionalities in order
to make the sightings approach more understandable and to
illustrate, how this approach can be used in this context. For
the detailed description of the design and implementation of
MISP, we refer the reader to [26].
General description of MISP
Fig. 1. The landing page in the MISP Interface
MISP is an open-source threat information sharing plat-
form, where users from the communities can share all kind
of threats, especially all kinds of indicators of compromise,
but also others such as financial indicators as for example
bank accounts of money mules, which were abused for money
laundering activities. The data model implemented in MISP for
sharing information is rather simple. The user can decide on
the granularity of information he wants to disclose in MISP and
on the same time can also set the sharing level (for example
in his organisation only, for a specific community only, for all
sharing groups) for his information. In order to familiarize the
reader with the terminology of MISP, we present some terms
to ease the understanding of the paper.
MISP is designed to be peer to peer, where multiple
instances can exchange information with each other. The syn-
chronization protocol in MISP resulted from a trial-and-error
approach, where the main criteria were efficiency, accuracy
and scalability. The resulting algorithm is a pull, push and
cherry-pick technique.
A shared information in MISP is called an event. An
event is composed of a list of attributes, also called attributes
(destination IP addresses, file hashes). Currently 140 types
are available in MISP software. An attribute is identified with
the tuple (category, type, value). An event is also linked with
contextual information such as date, threat level, description,
organisation, galaxies about threat actors and others.
To simplify the handling of adding information to MISP
and to avoid the filling of a time-consuming and tedious form,
a free text importer was integrated, that allows users to copy
and paste raw data into a single field. This text is then analyzed
by an heuristics-based algorithm to extract attributes which can
be validated by the user. For the filtering of events, it is referred
to taxonomies, which will be illustrated a bit more in detail.
Taxonomies
The MISP taxonomies are described in [7], and were
introduced for facilitating the description of IoCs and other
relevant information. It can be described as a classification
scheme having its own vocabulary.
A taxonomy in MISP is based on the machine-tag ap-
proach with triple-tags for representing semantic information,
as for example used on Flickr for the geolocation of pictures
[20]. The triple-tag syntax is a simple expression that has a
namespace, a predicate and a value, as shown in the following
example: {flora : flower = ’lily’}, this means that flora is the
namespace, flower is the predicate and ’lily’ the value.
The public repository1 with MISP taxonomies includes 47
different taxonomies for the domains of law enforcement, com-
puter security incident response team (CSIRT) classifications,
intelligence and many more. In this paper, we applied these
taxonomies to the scoring model in section V.
For the sake of clarity we presented MISP in this paper
to introduce to attribute scoring. For more information about
MISP and its functionalities, refer to the work of the authors
of MISP in [26].
IV. DATA INTERACTION METHODS
The typical single producer - multiple consumer paradigm
frequently used in threat intelligence platform was overthrown
in MISP. Each participating community can produce or con-
sume information. Typical shared information are signatures
for intrusion detection systems, which can be either exported
via python API (Application Programming Interface) or with
a crafted HTTP request. An intrusion detection system can ask
MISP software for the latest signatures and integrate them in
its detection system. Some intrusion detection systems can be
instrumented to sent a REST (REpresentational State Transfer)
request towards MISP with feedback about its detections. This
feedback is called sighting. Hence, knowledge can be gathered
about the validity, freshness of an information or its impact.
A typical example is an IP address of a compromised website
distributing malware or acting as command and control server.
However, in MISP the concept of detection and sighting is
not limited to network intrusion detection system, but also to
host intrusion detection systems capable of detecting malicious
files or more particular use cases. A common one is the
detection or blocking of phone numbers in PABX systems that
are used for malicious activities such as social engineering
attacks or silent or ping calls. Other examples are interaction
with accounting systems that are regularly automatically fed by
MISP with recent Money mule bank accounts used in fraud
cases. Hence, accountants get a warning in case they try to
do a wire transfer to these numbers. A typical use case are
CEO fraud attacks or intercepted and manipulated invoices.
As MISP is not used for sharing classical network intrusion
signatures, the term attribute is used in the following for
designating pieces of information that are shared or detected.
1https://github.com/MISP/misp-taxonomies
Each time a consumer receives such an attribute, the
consumer can open a discussion by entering free text with
questions or comments regarding a piece of consumed infor-
mation. These comments or questions are then propagated back
trough the MISP instances.
Although, non classified threat information, for instance IP
addresses about botnets, hashes about malware, are publicly
available2. For several years little research interest was there
for the application of this data as ground truth for anomaly
detection or machine learning algorithms. New attacks learned
from these training sets could be suggested to the producer.
Sighting
MISP provides a feature called sightings where users,
scripts or intrusion detection systems can share information
about a given consumed attribute. For instance, whether they
saw it or whether it is a false positive or has expiration dates
for some attributes. Sightings gives more credibility to an
attribute and can be used for prioritizing or decaying attributes.
Sightings are visually represented in MISP such as shown in
figure 2.
Also, aggregating sightings of all attributes/objects can
be useful to detect particular security events or threats. For
example, figure 3 is a visual representation of the occurrences
of sightings and false-positive for one week. We can observe
that on November 20 (2017), a lot of false positives were
detected, probably indicating a spam campaign. Also, on
November 17 (2017), a larger proportion of sightings than
the normal average is represented. This can raise suspicion
of security experts or the SOC (Security Operation Center)
that a more concerning threat is present. This should indicate
that a deeper investigation should be performed. Sightings are
valuable inputs for decaying attributes.
V. SCORING INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
To illustrate that the handling of these attributes and the
correctness of information is challenging, we will present some
numbers provided from our MISP community, we operate for
the private sector [4]. It includes 1 531 users from 761 different
organisations. These users have already shared 8 101 events
and 1 003 908 attributes until early December 2017.
A fact that makes the handling of these attributes even more
challenging is that the objectives from each user is different
and by this, having a non-homogeneous crowd. On one hand,
users want to use the data for implementing operational
security, such as, performing blocking actions based on shared
attributes like file hashes or IP addresses. Hence, false positives
are unwanted, since data needs to be correct and reliable.
On the other hand, organisations want to correlate attributes
and link them with additional threat actors. Hence, these
organisations need a correct and reliable source of historical
data.
In this section, a scoring technique for decaying attributes
in MISP including various factors such as its sightings in
operational networks, its taxonomies and the reliability of the
source is presented.
2http://www.misp-project.org/communities/
Fig. 2. Visual representation of sighting in MISP
Fig. 3. Visual representation of the aggregation of sightings
The lifetime of the various available attributes are not
homogeneous. For instance, hosts of machines related to IP
addresses are changed or cleaned up, IP addresses or domain
names are traded and hence get used in different fashions over
time. Hence, each attribute has its own decay function. File
hashes usually tend not to vary over time. Nevertheless, a
shared file hash can be declared as false positive over time
by organizations with distinct trust levels.
To fully evaluate the overall score of an attribute, some
conditions can be taken into consideration:
• The base score of an attribute, called base_score,
is a weighting of the confidence of its source and the
taxonomies attached to it. It is the initial value of an
indicator’s life cycle. It is also the score the indicator
will be reset to upon a new sighting.
• The period of time expressed between the time an
attribute was seen first and the time it was seen last.
• The end-time of an attribute τa represents the time at
which the overall score should be 0.
• The decay rate δa represents the speed at which the
overall score is decreasing over time. It would be
preferable that the decay speed is variable over time.
To illustrate this, an example of an IP address is taken.
The decay rate of the IP should be low for the first
hours, but should go faster the more time passes. The
first time activities from this IP are sighted, the better
chances are that the threat actors are still active or are
executing follow up operations. When this IP address
is shared among a community targeted by the threat
actor, more and more members can take measures,
such as blocking the IP address. Hence, the attack
becomes ineffective forcing threat actors to use other
IP addresses. In case, the IP is given up, it could
be reassigned to a legitimate customer of the Internet
service provider leading to collateral damage due to
the blocking actions of this IP.
MISP is a peer to peer system where people can produce and
consume information about threats in a collaborative manner.
Hence, it is common that information transits through multiple
MISP instances until it gets to its consumer. Producers can add
tags defined in taxonomies, introduced in section III, about
their confidence or reliability of their source about a given
piece of information they are encoding. Consumers get this
information and have different levels of trust in the producers.
The base_scorea of an attribute is defined in equation
1, base score ∈ [0, 100]. It represents the score of an attribute
before taking into account its decay. It is composed of its
weighted applied tags and its source confidence.
The weights of the applied taxonomies are defined at
predicate level of each taxonomy and represent its acceptance
within a community. For instance, if tags from the taxonomy
with the namespace admiralty-scale and with the pred-
icate source-reliability are hardly used, it gets a low
weight. However, if within the same taxonomy tags with the
predicate information-credibility are regularly used,
it gets a higher weight.
The source confidence can also be influenced by an addi-
tional parameter called ωsc. This parameter takes into account
more subtle trust evaluations. For example, it could be that
an organization has a good image and a good reputation but
due to some circumstances within a given time frame, the
trust in this organization is decreased. A practical example
is an organization that was compromised or taken over by the
attacking party.
base scorea = weigthtg · tags+ ωsc · source confidence
(1)
The base score is defined in equation 1 with,
• ∀weigthtg ∈ [0, 100] ,∀ωsc ∈ [0, 100] , weighttg +
ωsc = 100, weighttg = 100 or ωsc = 100, a
mean to adjust the focus either on the tags or on
the source confidence. As little research on the trust
rebalancing and trust evolution of organizations in
distributed threat sharing is done, the ωsc parameter
is set to 100 − weighttg and is considered as future
work implying further research.
• tags ∈ [0, 1], the score derived from the taxonomies
is defined in equation 2.
• source confidence ∈ [0, 1], is the confidence
given to the source that published the attribute. The
source confidence parameter in equation 1 gives a
possibility to influence the base score, which should
be a number between 0 and 100. Each source between
1 and N has its source confidence level. In case a
source is fully trusted the source confidence is set
to 1. If there is no trust, the source level is set to
0. The user could also set intermediate values, which
could give an estimate on how reliable the source is.
The learning of the confidence of a source based on
its produced information over time is subject to future
research.
The tags parameter in equation 1 is derived from the
taxonomies a producer can attach to its piece of information.
A few used taxonomies allow to add confidence or reliability
on a produced information. The tags in the taxonomies can be
attached to each individual encoded attribute. The taxonomies
available in MISP platforms permit to derive confidence and
reliability are defined in table I.
Description Value(s) Description Value(s)
Misp OSINT
Completely confident 100 Certain 100
Usually confident 75 Almost certain 93
Fairly confident 50 Probable 75
Rarely confident 25 Chances about even 50
Unconfident 0 Probably not 30
Impossibility 0
TABLE I. MISP AND OSINT TAXONOMIES
These taxonomies are: MISP machine tag3, admirality
scale4, OSINT5 and estimative language6. As these taxonomies
are already used by large MISP communities, a scoring model
should be derived from these ones instead of suggesting new
ones, as it is unknown if the new ones will be used by the
communities.
The MISP taxonomy includes a confidence level that is
’Confidence cannot be evaluated’. This special confidence
level is not mapped to a numerical value. One possibility is to
introduce the concept of ’undefined’.
Once a value is undefined, the base score cannot be
computed and becomes undefined. At the end, the overall
score would be undefined and by this, cancel other scoring
factors defined in tags. Hence, when the confidence level is
’Confidence cannot be evaluated’, it will be ignored.
The score derived from the taxonomies is defined in equation
2, where G is the number of defined taxonomy groups and
T the number of used taxonomy per group. The weights are
defined at predicate level in the taxonomies and should be
integer numbers between 0 and 100.
tags =
∑j=G
j=1
∑i=T
i=1 taxonomyi ∗ weighti∑j=G
j=1
∑i=T
i=1 100 · weighti
(2)
The idea is to decrease the base_score over time. When
it reaches zero, the related indicator can be discarded. A first
idea to express the overall score could be to use equation 3.
scorea = base_scorea − δa(Tt − Tt−1) (3)
where,
• base_scorea ∈ [0, 100] is described in equation 1.
• δa ∈ [0,+∞ represents the decay rate, or expressed as
the speed at which the score of an attribute decreases
over time.
• Tt and Tt−1 are timestamps. Tt represents the current
time and Tt−1 represents the last time this attribute
received a sighting. Note that Tt > Tt−1.
Figure 4 shows the decay of the score of an attribute a
with a base_scorea of 80 and a decay rate δa of 2.
3https://github.com/MISP/misp-taxonomies/blob/master/misp/machinetag.json
4https://github.com/MISP/misp-taxonomies/tree/master/admiralty-scale
5https://github.com/MISP/misp-taxonomies/blob/master/osint/machinetag.json
6https://github.com/MISP/misp-taxonomies/blob/master/estimative-
language/machinetag.json
Fig. 4. scorea = base_scorea − δa(Tt − Tt−1). The decay of the
score is constant.
Fig. 5. scorea = base_scorea ·e−δa·t. The decay of the score follows
an exponential degression.
An evaliatoin of the parameters shows that neither the end-
time nor the variable decay rate can be controlled. Indeed, by
fixing the decay rate, the end-time cannot be specified for the
score of an attribute. In the same mind, even if the decay rate
is controlled by the constant δa, the decay is fixed over time.
To address the latter point, an exponential degression could
be considered as shown in equation 4.
scorea = base_scorea · e−δa·t (4)
In this case a variable decay rate can be used. The slope
in figure 5 is high at the beginning and lower as time passes.
However, the decay rate cannot be significantly influenced.
This expression cannot be used to have a slow decay at the
beginning followed by a rapid degression. A behaviour that
can, for example, be found in dynamic IP address allocation by
threat actors as previously described in this section. Moreover,
the time at which the overall score of the attribute should be
0 is entirely defined by the decay rate. So, manipulating the
slope as well as the end-time at the same time is still not
possible. Furthermore, it can be observed that the choice of
the parameter δa will essentially range between 0 and 1 due to
the tendency of the exponential degression to rapidly becomes
assymptotic to 0.
Fig. 6. scorea = base_score ·
(
1−
(
t
τa
) 1
δa
)
for a fixed τa of 7
days
The final score is defined in equation 5, capturing the
conditions stated previously.
scorea = base_scorea ·
(
1−
(
t
τa
) 1
δa
)
(5)
with
• δa ∈ ]0,+∞ , the decay speed.
• τa ∈ ]0,+∞ , the end-time or time needed such
that scorea = 0. The end-time can be told by
an expiration sighting, where an organization knows
when an indicator will be expired. An example is
the grace time: an Internet service provider gives a
grace time to customers to fix their machine until dis-
connecting them or law enforcement agencies seizing
the equipments. It can also be derived from existing
regular sightings, where organizations provided data
about sightings from the past.
• t = Tt − Tt−1, is an integer > 0
This polynomial function has two advantages over the
exponential one. First, the end-time τa can be easily controlled.
direction of the slope’s cavity. We can have fast degression at
the beginning can be obtained followed by a slow degression
along with the complete opposite. An example for a different
decay rate δa can be seen in figure 6. It can be seen that
the greater δa is, the faster the overall score decreases at the
beginning. The closer δa is to zero, the slower the overall score
will decrease at the start. The score is 0 for all decay rate for
the specified τa.
The parameters can easily be fine tuned, which is an
additional advantage. A value can be set for each type of
attribute by performing a statistical analysis on an existing
dataset; an example of such derivation is presented in section
VI; or users could set their own values via a dedicated
interface. An idea on how this could be done is given in figure
7.
Two examples are shown on how the score in equation
5 can be used. The first example is an attribute for a com-
promised IP address being part of a botnet. The attribute of
Fig. 7. Web interface letting the user select the parameters. source: www.desmos.com
Fig. 8. scorea = 80 ·
(
1−
(
t
7·24
) 1
0.55
)
- It can be seen a rapid decrease
of the score at the beginning. The score is halved after 48 hours.
a shared event in MISP belongs to the category Network
activity with its type ip-dest, meaning the destination
IP address of a compromised webserver hosting an exploitkit
distributing malware. Some organizations spotted it and started
to share information about it. Abuse teams are informed to
cleanup the compromised systems. The IP address is encoded
in publicly available blacklists. The threat actors might notice
the detection too and start to move their exploitkit to another
webserver. If we assume that the Internet service provider
gives a customer 1 week time to fix the webserver. If it is
not fixed within this time frame, the IP of the webserver
will be null-routed, meaning that it will not be accessible any
more. Hence, τa = 7 · 24 hours. Under the hypothesis that the
typical blacklists take 48 hours to be applied in proxy servers
or browsers, the overall score should be halved after 2 days.
Hence, δa = 0.55. Finally, if the base score of the attribute is
calculated to be base_score= 80 (based on the taxonomies
and source confidence), equation 5 becomes:
scorea = 80 ·
(
1−
(
t
7 · 24
) 1
0.55
)
where t is the time between now and the last sighting,
expressed in hours. A plot of the decay is represented in figure
8.
The second example is the hash of a malware. In this
scenario, a file-hash is not as volatile as an IP. It could be
considered that the attribute will not have any value after 2
months, with a rather slow decay. We can now set τa = 2 · 30
days and δa = 0.3. It is also supposed that the base score is
the same as the previous example: base_score= 80. We
Fig. 9. scorea = 80 ·
(
1−
(
t
2·30
) 1
0.3
)
- A really slow decrease at the
beginning and a rush towards zero at the end can be observed. The overall
score is halved only after 48 hours.
have:
scorea = 80 ·
(
1−
(
t
2 · 30
) 1
0.3
)
and the resulting plot can be seen in figure 9.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION: TUNING τ AND δ
USING A PHISHING DATASET
In this section, we show how to fine-tune the two param-
eters of the model using basic statistical analysis on a real
dataset.
The original dataset consists in attributes of type URL
related to phishing campaigns, available at SOME URL7.
Statistics about the dataset are shown in table VI.
Time spanned May 24, 2017 → May 3, 2018
Number of attribute 583783
Number of sighting 92713361
Mean (µ) of sighting / attribute 333
Stdev (σ) of sighting / attribute 1071
Fig. 10. Statistics on the dataset used to evaluate the parameters
This dataset has been processed in order to deduce the end-
time of each attributes using sightings. For each of them, the
end-time was calculated as follow:
end-time = (tn − t0) + ∆max
Where,
• t0 is the time at which the attribute was seen for the
first time
• tn is the time at which the attribute was seen for the
last time
• ∆max is the longer time elapsed between 2 sightings
From a CSIRT perspective, it is critical to take down (or
request it) compromised servers as fast as possible. Even if
7SOMEURLSOME URL
Fig. 11. Timeline showing the method to compute the end_time
long-living URLs are important, we only consider short-lived
URLs in the evaluation. Longer URLs are a special case that
is out of scope for this section and so, are treated as outliers
and ignored.
This processed dataset can be used to deduce the two
parameters8. The first one we are interested in is τ (the end-
time). By looking at the histogram VI showing the repartition
of the calculated end-time over time9, we can see that the
majority of attributes are located within the first week.
Fig. 12. Histogram of the end_time for the complete dataset (log scale)
By zooming in the first week we obtain the histogram VI
where more information can be obtained.
As stated previously, the majority of the end-time is sitting
in the first week. Moreover, the CDF indicate that ∼ 90% of
the attributes shown on the graph falls within 5 days. Then, it
is reasonable to consider that the end-time is:
τ = 5 days = 120 hours
The value of the second parameter δ can be estimated
by looking at the general tendency of the histogram. It is
clear that the slope cavity is directed towards the bottom,
indicating an increasing speed of decay over the time. Even
before computing δ, we can see that this parameter will be
> 0.
Again, by looking at the CDF, 50% of the attributes for
the first week are located around 3 days (72 hours). Then, it
is also reasonable to say that after 3 days, half of the attribute
8In this section, the base_score is assumed to be 100
9Note the log scale
Fig. 13. Histogram of the calculated end_time for the first week
have expired. Hence, the score at this point is 50. We can now
compute δ:
score = base_score ·
(
1−
(
t
τ
) 1
δ
)
⇔ 50 = 100 ·
(
1−
(
72
120
) 1
δ
)
⇔ δ ' 1.3
Finally, attributes of type URL concerning phishing cam-
paing can use these estimated parameters to be scored.
This evaluation can be used by IDS to select which rules
to play on. Practically, IDS are limited on the number of entry
they can charge at the same time, and so, only a portion of
attributes can be loaded as a rule. By using such instantiation of
the presented model and an appropriate threshold on the score,
an IDS could support volatile URL partaining in phishing
camapaign.
A simulation of this is shown in the chart VI and VI. The
simulation has been done for a period of 2 months using the
data from the initial dataset. It can be seen that nearly 60% of
the entries were correctly removed from the IDS table, while
40% of them were removed prematurily.
VII. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
Information sharing has become an integrated part in the
resolution of incidents nowadays. The MISP platform is a
unique tool that not only allows the sharing of information,
but also allows to contribute useful addons by the community
in a trusted environment.
In this paper, we presented early works on scoring mecha-
nisms for attributes that are shared within MISP. As MISP is a
distributed peer to peer threat sharing system, where each par-
ticipating organization can consume or produce information, a
consumer can receive information multiple hops away. Hence,
Fig. 14. Simulation of an IDS supporting the model
Fig. 15. Percentage of correctly vs prematurely removed entries
a consumer has to somehow trust the producing organisation.
The producing organization has some taxonomies in MISP for
attaching reliability or credibility to the attribute it is sharing.
In this paper a base score is defined to combine these different
trust aspects. Due to the different life times of attributes, a
scoring method is presented, taking into account standard data
interaction methods in MISP.
In distributed threat sharing models such as MISP, trust is
an essential factor. In future research activities various models
for the source confidence will be evaluated. A potential
research track is the evaluation and application of machine
learning techniques. However, for evaluating these, the simple
model described in V must be operational such that a signifi-
cant dataset about sharing behaviours can be collected. Another
research track, which might need less operational data is the
exploration of game theoretical models in context of distributed
information sharing. MISP was growing organically, where
only a few MISP instances were interconnected and where
the members of the various communities knew and trusted
each other. However, today, it is not uncommon that a piece
of information transits through a couple of MISP instances
and only little is known about the producer or even the
source of information. Hence, it could be that some adversaries
share fake information for harming organizations or disrupting
sharing communities. Detailed adversary models in the context
of peer to peer threat sharing might be useful to be studied.
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